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Reality Bites: The Collision of Rhetoric, Rights, 
and Reality and the Library Bill of Rights 
SHIRLEYA. WIEGAND 
A~STRACT 
THISARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT THE LIBRARY PROFESSION examine the Library Bill 
of Rights and remove from it those statements which do not represent 
current legal principles. Library professionals and their patrons must 
have available a clear statement of those First Amendment principles which 
receive legal support. A carefully edited document would serve as that 
statement. The material culled from the Library Bill of Rights may con- 
tribute to the creation of a second document which would represent the 
profession’s aspirational and inspirational creed. This creed, albeit lack- 
ing in legal support, might provide inspiration to library professionals 
and would provide them with a standard which goes beyond First Amend- 
ment mandate. It might be incorporated into the employment contract 
for library professionals, but it would not represent the current state of 
legal principles. This proposal separates rhetoric from rights to produce 
a set of principles which reflect reality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Because this article focuses on three distinct but related issues-rheto- 
ric, rights, and reality-it is in one sense a series of expanded “sound 
bites.” But the term “bite” has a more significant meaning here. When 
examining the Library Bill of Rights, it becomes clear that the rhetoric of 
rights often clashes with reality; reliance upon the rhetoric will, in the 
final analysis, lead to the conclusion that reality bites. This article pro- 
poses a realistic approach to the rhetoric of rights. 
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RHETORIC 
“Religious sect”-“pro-life”-“feminist”-“radical”-“far left”-“far 
right”-“political correctness.” Readers will probably agree these are 
“buzzwords”-i.e., shorthand hot button terms and phrases that often 
produce a visceral emotional reaction. But the same can be said for words 
like “rights” and “censorship.” These words are frequently bandied about 
within the library and legal communities, yet they end up meaning differ- 
ent things to different people. The Library Bill of Rights is rife with 
examples of rhetoric unsupported by the legal principles that usually 
undergird “rights.” Baldwin addresses these in his article in this issue of 
Library Trends. This article, however, focuses primarily on just one ex- 
ample-censorship. 
When a library patron requests a particular book that is not included 
in the library collection, is expensive, and has not been requested by 
anyone else, the librarian may refuse to order the book, believing she or 
he is simply exercising goodjudgment and responding in the community’s 
best interest. The patron, however, believes the library has engaged in 
censorship. 
Amy Hielsberg, a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison’s School of Library and Information Studies, complained pub- 
licly about “censorship” in her intellectual freedom class in the fall of 
1993 (Hielsberg, 1994, p. 768). As her class presentation, she had de- 
cided to focus on the controversial novel American Psycho by Bret Easton 
Ellis (1991). She was well aware of the criticism directed at the book. 
Simon and Schuster had reneged on a decision to publish it; the Los 
Angeles chapter of the National Organization for Women had called it 
“misogynist” and a “manual on the mutilation of women” (p. 768). As 
Hielsberg began reading a passage she described as “a gruesome scene 
about the electrocution of a prostitute by means ofjumper cables and the 
dismemberment and decapitation of a female acquaintance,” one stu- 
dent objected. “I will not listen to another word of this!” she shouted. 
“You are verbally abusing me.” Hielsberg claims she was shocked: “The 
last thing I had expected was to be ‘challenged’ in an intellectual free- 
dom class,” she said. ‘‘Ididn’t expect a fight” (pp. 768, 769). 
Why not? Why didn’t she expect a fight? And why was the challenge 
viewed so unfavorably? Why didn’t she expect some students to speak 
out? In fact, the challenge gave Hielsberg an opportunity to defend her 
selection of topics and to formulate arguments supporting her decision 
to read the controversial selection. Yet she believed the student who spoke 
out was engaging in the sin of censorship rather than exercising herright 
to object. Criticism is not censorship. 
Another writer, a public library trustee, related his experience at an 
American Library Association (ALA) Conference in June 1990 (Sheerin, 
1991, p. 440). A self-described “First Amendment purist,” speaking to 
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the crowd, condemned a series of censorship attempts by various right- 
wing groups. During a question and answer period, the library trustee 
spoke up. A state-funded library agency had refused to accept as a dona- 
tion the film The Silent Scream (1985), which claims to show, through ul- 
trasound imaging, the destruction of a fetus during abortion. He also 
noted that a citizen had complained that community libraries failed to 
stock anti-abortion materials. Did the speaker believe such an act also 
constituted censorship? The ALA speaker responded only with a “be- 
mused shrug of the shoulders” (Sheerin, 1991, p. 440). 
Nat Hentoff (1992), author of Free Speech for Me, But Not for Thee, re- 
calls a trip he took to Idaho to give a speech on the First Amendment. At 
the time, Coeur d’Alene, a town of 20,000 people, had been keenly di- 
vided over a series of textbooks in the schools. “Opponents of the texts 
claimed that the books proselytized for witchcraft, satanism, and the oc- 
cult,” he writes. When a local minister came to see Hentoff: “We went 
over a couple of volumes, and he pointed out what he saw as the satanism, 
the violence, the subliminal preaching of witchcraft” (p. 4). Hentoff dis- 
agreed with the minister about the dangers of the texts, but he wasn’t the 
only one. Advocates of the new texts “were spreading the word that [the 
minister] and his followers were not only censors but kooks, zealots, ob-
viously unable to take part in any meaningful dialogue on school curricu- 
lum.” Furthermore, the text advocates complained: “These are the people 
...who are trying to impose theirvalues on us.” But the minister astutely 
observed to Hentoff? “Sure1 y...we have a right to protest, a right to fight 
for our beliefs” (pp. 45) .  Hentoff agreed and so do I. 
When citizens of any persuasion engage in censorship rhetoric, what 
do they mean? Do they mean that any attempt to question or challenge 
them is itself censorship? Does it mean that silencing a particular view- 
point is not censorship but merely goodjudgment? At least one librarian 
has acknowledged “the simple truth that libraries not only gather and 
dispense information; they also select and screen it. The librarian is, by 
the very nature of his role in society, a censor. ..” (Swan, 1979, p. 2042). 
The state agency that refused to accept the donation of The Silent 
Screamjustified its decision by asserting that some of the points in the film 
are “medically questionable” (Sheerin, 1991, p. 444, n.1). That argu- 
ment might be plausible if a library book poses an immediate medical 
danger. Take, for example, a mushroom encyclopedia Baldwin discusses 
in his article, which erroneously identifies a poisonous mushroom as harm- 
less.’ But the argument is not as compelling in the circumstances men- 
tioned above when it begins to suggest viewpoint censorship. Although 
the term “censorship” is often misused or abused, it is not the case that 
the term cannot be defined. It can be. And it is of utmost importance 
that library professionals examine the definition before using such an 
incendiary word. 
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines censorship as: “Review of publications, 
movies, plays, and the like for the purpose of prohibiting the publica- 
tion, distribution, or production of material deemed objectionable as 
obscene, indecent, or immoral” (1990, p. 224). Under this definition, 
the student who objected to the gruesome readings in Hielsberg’s class 
was making no attempt to censor but was merely expressing a personal 
objection to having to listen to extremely offensive speech. On the other 
hand, a Library which refuses to “distribute” a work based on particular 
grounds other than financial may in fact be engaging in censorship. 
Black’s Law Dictionary (1992) refers to the prohibition of works which 
are “obscene, indecent, or immoral” as an event which implicates censor- 
ship. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language points out that a 
censor is “an official who examines books, plays, news reports . . .etc., for the 
purpose of suppressing parts deemed objectionable on moral, political, mili- 
tary, or othergrounds” (Flexner, 1987, p. 334). Under either definition, cnti- 
cism of, or a challenge to, particular books or other works does not consti- 
tute censorship. Prohibition or suppression does constitute censorship, but 
only if the work is prohibited or suppressed because of its objectionable 
content. Thus, a library may refuse to stock a particular book because the 
library has only limited funds and it believes, in good faith, that the commu- 
nity it serves would not use such a book. 
But when a library refuses to stock an entire type of book despite 
public demand, then a charge of censorship becomes more compelling. 
Why, for example, would a library refuse to stock any of the wildly popu- 
lar Nancy Drew books?2 Public demand-or not-may dictate whether a 
library is engaging in censorship. When a library refuses to purchase (or 
even accept a gift of) Madonna’s (1992) book, Sex, despite public de- 
mand, an assertion that it is engaging in censorship also seems sound. 
Contrast two approaches to this now-dated controversy. 
One librarian, while initially relishing the publicity and media atten- 
tion he received, quickly backed down. When the mayor asked him to 
cancel the order for Madonna’s book, he complied: “He’s the boss; these 
are public funds”-i.e., funds collected from the tax-paying public, not 
from the mayor personally. Within days, citizens had donated three cop- 
ies to the library, and the mayor thereafter left the decision to the library 
board. Still, the librarian responded, “I will recommend that the board 
not accept the gift, and they will probably take my advice.” The book, he 
says, is “pure trash, not even well designed” (Kniffel, 1992, p. 902). An-
other librarian ordered the book despite the mayor’s public statement 
that the book was pornographic and did not belong in the public library. 
She stated: “We are trying to get people to understand the concept of 
freedom of information and the dangers of censorship” (p. 903). From 
these examples in the library community, it would appear that one man’s 
rhetoric (of censorship) is another (wo)man’s reality. 
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RIGHTS 
The rhetoric of “rights” creates confusion and is often unrealistic. 
Again a definitional analysis will prove helpful. A “bill of rights,” accord- 
ing to a standard dictionary, is “a statement of the rights belonging to or 
sought by any group” (Flexner, 1987, p. 207). Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines it as a “formal and emphatic legislative assertion and declaration of 
popular rights and liberties ...” (Black, 1990, p. 164). 
As a first step, it is obvious that any effective statement of rights must 
at least be understandable. Baldwin (1996) has discussed at length in his 
article the problems of ambiguity and vagueness which mar the Library 
Bill of Rights. But, it can be argued, the U. S. Bill of Rights suffers from 
the same problems. After all, what does it mean to say that: “Awell regu- 
lated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” (US.  Constitu-
tion, amendment II)? Or that “[tlhe right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated” (US .  Constitution, amendment IV)? 
But for over a period of 200 years, the national document, unlike the 
library document, has benefitted from scrutiny by thousands of scholars, 
along with federal and state judges alike. Judicial interpretive opinions 
have been reduced to writing and distributed to the offices of every law- 
yer in the country. The First Amendment is the law of the land. 
But such is not the case with the library’s document. “The LBR [Li- 
brary Bill of Rights] is nobody’s law; it is a declaration of guiding prin- 
ciples” (Swan, 1979, p. 2043). Although numerous pages of interpreta-
tion serve to flesh out some of the skeletal six articles, the document 
remains rhetoric mixed with reality. It is, therefore, all the more impor- 
tant that the document be worded clearly, carefully, and, as Baldwin has 
noted, more realistically. 
This article will not repeat Baldwin’s criticism. Of course he is cor-
rect in asserting that “the legal basis for the Library Bill of Rights is weak.” 
He is also correct when he notes that it “promises more than the First 
Amendment guarantees.” 
How can one possibly reconcile the Library Bill of Rights with cur- 
rent legal principles concerning minors? The library policy would give 
free unrestricted use of the library and library materials to minors to the 
same extent that it gives adults. But the legal system recognizes a clear 
distinction between the two groups, refusing to provide to minors the 
same rights guaranteed to adults. No matter how strongly the library 
profession believes in the minor’s right of access, no matter how strongly 
worded the Library Bill of Rights, an argument in favor of providing mi- 
nors with the full panoply of rights would fail in a court of law. 
But the fact that the library’s document promises more than it can 
deliver should not be condemned for that reason alone. After all, 
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governmental actions can certainly provide more protection than the Con- 
stitution requires; they simply cannot provide less. The Constitution serves 
as a floor, not a ceiling. What may legitimately be condemned, though, is 
the false representation that the Library Bill of Rights serves as a legal 
guarantee or as an accurate reflection of current legal doctrine. 
Before examining more closely the issue of “rights,” however, an ini- 
tial set of questions must be addressed. Who is the audience? For whom 
is the Library Bill of Rights drafted? For the profession generally? For 
library patrons? For individual library administrators? Isn’t a bill of rights 
drafted to inform a particular group of its protected rights? If so, then 
the audience for the Library Bill of Rights consists of library patrons. Do 
they ever read it? Do they know it exists? Is it accurate and helpful? Can 
they enforce it? 
Assume that a patron does have access to the Library Bill of Rights 
and reads Article 2: “Libraries should provide materials and information 
presenting all points ofview on current and historical issues’’ (ALA, 1992, 
p. 3) .  The patron wishes the library to order an expensive book or movie, 
which documents an obscure historical event. Because of the low de- 
mand and high price, the library refuses. Can the patron, armed with 
her “bill of rights,” march into court to enforce it? Probably not. 
Assume also that a patron reading the Library Bill of Rights encoun- 
ters Article 3: “Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment 
of their responsibility to provide information and enlightenment” (ALA, 
1992, p. 3) .  The patron wishes to file a lawsuit against a magazine which 
refused to publish an article of his, calling it “incendiary separatist tripe.” 
Can the patron demand his “right” to have the library challenge this act of 
censorship (even if his work is of great value and is denied publication 
solely because of its content)? Of course not. 
So, if the Library Bill of Rights is at times unhelpful to library pa- 
trons, what good does it serve? More likely than not, it is designed for an 
audience of professional librarians. But if all they read is the six-article 
Bill of Rights along with the interpretations, they too may find it at times 
unhelpful and at other times downright misleading. It will not offer much 
protection in the midst of a First Amendment dispute. 
It seems clear that the Library Bill of Rights seeks to serve two very 
different communities for two very different purposes. How can a docu- 
ment inform library patrons of their actual rights and still inspire library 
professionals to strive for something more, to reach beyond the mere 
letter of the law, to serve as a “bulwark of our constitutional republic” 
( A M ,  1992, p. ix)? 
REALITY 

Consider a proposal that provides a realistic approach to library policy 
and legal principles. Perhaps the library community would benefit from 
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two documents. Certainly a statement of principles which satisfy First 
Amendment requirements would be helpful-e.g., a bill of rights which 
reflects First Amendment analysis and sets forth clearly the narrow legal 
rights which belong to library patrons. Librarians must know precisely 
what conduct will trigger First Amendment protections, and library pa- 
trons must know when such conduct is actionable-i.e., when a court of 
law will intervene to enforce patrons’ legal rights. 
But it might also be helpful to view a document like the current Library 
Bill of Rights as an additional aspirational creed, something which provides 
more than minimal protection to library patrons and serves a purpose other 
than a bill of rights. It would serve as guidance for private libraries as well, 
which are not subject to the same constitutional stricture as public libraries. 
And it would go beyond the minimal protection offered by the First Amend- 
ment. As mentioned previously, governmental actors can certainly provide 
more protection than the constitution requires. 
Baldwin’s constitutional critique would certainly contribute to the 
document of legal principles-i.e., the accurately titled “bill of rights” 
with the First Amendment serving as its foundation. The second docu- 
ment would operate aspirationally and inspirationally and focus not on 
the rights of library patrons but on the institutional behavior of librar- 
ians. The second document could be titled “A Call to Arms” or the “Li- 
brary Manifesto” or the “Librarian’s Code of Ethics.” The latter, of course, 
will have a familiar ring. The ALA Council adopted a Code of Ethics 
years ago, which, surprisingly, is not well-known. Its current form, sub- 
stantially amended from the 1981 version, was adopted by the ALACoun-
cil on June 28, 1995 (see Appendix). 
The ALA Code ofEthics (ALA, 1995) consists of a preamble and eight 
principles. It marks a substantial improvement over its predecessor and, 
at the same time, acknowledges its limited value as a framework only. It 
speaks in general terms about the profession’s commitment to: (1)equi-
table service and access; (2) intellectual freedom and resistance to “all 
efforts to censor”; (3) privacy and confidentiality; (4) intellectual prop- 
erty rights; (5) fair treatment in the workplace; (6) subordinating one’s 
personal interest and convictions to one’s professional responsibilities; 
and (7) professional growth. 
In its current form, the ALA Code ofEthics is laudable, but it suffers from 
a lack of specificity. Its aspirational and inspirational functions should not be 
ignored. But what will make it a workable, helpful document is the addition 
of commentary designed to demonstrate the circumstances under which the 
document will operate and to suggest ethical responses to real situations. It 
might more accurately be titled a Statement of Philosophy.?’ 
At the same time, librarians must be advised that the document-the 
Statement of Philosophy-goes beyond legal mandate. Unlike the now 
streamlined Bill of Rights suggested earlier, this statement would reflect a 
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belief in more protection than the law requires. It is in this statement 
that much of the rhetoric now culled from the current Library Bill of 
Rights might be reinstated. In this document, librarians can set as their 
goal the advocacy of minors’ rights, a strengthening of First Amendment 
protection, and advocacy against censorship, recognizing that, although 
the legal system might not support such a position, the library profession 
favors it nevertheless. The great difficulty of adopting such an aspirational 
statement is that, unlike the proposed “bill of rights,” the statement will 
not have the force of law.4 A comparison to the lawyer’s code of ethics 
might prove helpful here. 
The legal community in all fifty states is governed by Rules of Profes- 
sional Conduct. These rules are initially drafted as “model” rules by a 
national legal organization, the American Bar Association (similar in its 
role to the American Library Association). “Comments” accompany the 
rules themselves. They “provide guidance for practicing in compliance 
with the rules [but] do not add obligations to the rules” (Wisconsin Su- 
preme Court Rule Ch. 20 Preamble, hereinafter Wis. SCR). The com- 
ments generally employ specific examples of ethical dilemmas lawyers 
face and offer clear interpretations of the rules that govern resolution of 
the dilemma. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Comments have no 
force in and of themselves. But the Model Rules, once adopted by the 
American Bar Association, then become the subject of discussion and 
amendment by each of the separate state legal communities. Judges and 
lawyers in each state discuss and evaluate the model rules and occasion- 
ally suggest minor changes. The state supreme court then adopts the 
model rules, as amended, as state supreme court rules. The result is that 
lawyers in all fifty states are governed by the Rules of Professional Con- 
duct adopted for their particular state, but which bear a remarkable simi- 
larity to the original model rule. 
These rules govern the behavior of all lawyers practicing within the 
state, subjecting those lawyers to sanctions for violation of the rules, even 
when such behavior is otherwise legal. For example, in Wisconsin, the 
rules provide that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to 
a client” (Wis. SCR 2O:l.l); “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client” (Wis. SCR 20:1.3); and “[a] 
lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a mat-
ter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information” (Wis. 
SCR 20:1.4(a)). Another Rule requires that: 
[A] lawyer shall not reveal [attorney-client] information. . . except. . . 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the 
client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that .  . . is likely 
to result in death or substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury 
to the financial interest of another... (Wis. SCR 20:1.6) 
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The persuasiveness of these rules, that which makes them more than 
aspirational, lies in their enforcement. Because lawyers cannot practice 
law without a license, they are subject to such licensing requirements as 
each state supreme court chooses to adopt. That same court enforces the 
requirements through state bar disciplinary boards. Violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct may result in public or private reprimands, mon- 
etary penalties, or even revocation of the license to practice law (Wis. 
SCR 21.06). Without that license, a lawyer, like a doctor, cannot practice 
his or her profession. 
A review of recent state court proceedings reveals the seriousness 
with which the Rules of Professional Conduct are taken. For example, in 
just one month-June 1995-the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered 
whether three different attorneys had failed to act with reasonable dili- 
gence in representing their clients. In all three cases, the court suspended 
the attorneys’ licenses for periods ranging from sixty days to eighteen 
months.5 A few months later, the court suspended another attorney’s 
license for nine months on the same grounds.6 And in October 1994, the 
court revoked the license of an attorney for misappropriating client funds.’ 
Despite public criticism of attorney conduct, it is clear that the legal code 
of ethics is capable of enforcement. 
But the library community has no such authority. In August 1994, 
Rose Beushausen, a resident of Mokena, Illinois, placed an exhibit in the 
local public library display window after receiving permission from the 
library’s “window organizer” (Stevens, 1994, p. 1).The controversial “Baby 
Richard” court decision concerning the conflicting rights of adoptive and 
birth parents had recently evoked widespread public sentiment, and the 
library window display focused on adoption rights. When the library di- 
rector ordered it removed, Beushausen, who even cited the Library Bill 
of Rights, unsuccessfully sought assistance from the American Library 
Association. Although ALA appeared to agree that Beushausen’s inter- 
pretation of the Bill of Rights was correct and that her exhibit should not 
have been removed, an MA official could only respond that “the associa- 
tion has no authority over library administrations” and that “Beushausen’s 
only recourse would be to file a lawsuit on constitutional grounds” (p. 1). 
If librarians were required to obtain a license to practice their trade, 
states (or other licensing bodies) could place restrictions upon the li- 
cense, as the legal system has done for attorneys and the medical profes- 
sion for doctors. Without the licensing requirement, any code which the 
library community adopts-the Library Bill of Rights, the ALA Code of 
Ethics, a Statement of Principles-lacks the disciplinary weight of the 
lawyer’s Professional Rules of Conduct. 
Clearly, if the Library Bill of Rights were stripped of the rhetoric 
which currently is unsupported by legal doctrine, the remaining docu- 
ment would have the First Amendment as its foundation. But the second 
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document which this article proposes-the Statement of Principles- would 
continue to lack such authority. But that does not mean it is superfluous. 
Such a document can play a vital role in the library profession. It can 
provide a basis for the myriad controversial decisions which librarians 
must make. It can serve as a philosophical framework within which goals 
and objectives might be set. It can serve as an ideal and provide an excit- 
ing vision for the future. 
And such a document does not entirely lack enforceability. Obvi-
ously, librarians are accountable for their conduct to their supervisors, 
their supervising agencies and, in many cases, to the public at large. Com- 
pliance with library rules and regulations-including the Statement of 
Principles-could well be part of their employment contracts, and viola- 
tion could result in dismissal. But this kind of enforcement cannot be 
uniform and national in scope. Unless the American Library Association 
becomes a licensing body, it will not play a significant role in the enforce- 
ment of its policies. Its role will remain that of a policy-issuing body- 
and that, in fact, may be its proper role. 
One thing is clear. Without the dissection of the current Library Bill 
of Rights, librarians and library users are left with a document that is at 
times merely aspirational and inspirational, at times unrealistic, and at 
times absolutely mandatory under the First Amendment. Such a docu- 
ment simultaneously requires librarians to fall short of the mark because 
of ambiguous and unrealistic statements, and yet to comply with First 
Amendment principles in order to avoid a lawsuit. Baldwin is correct in 
suggesting that the document be redrafted. But doing so might sacrifice 
the truly laudable goals in the document. For the sake of clarity, it would 
be preferable for librarians-and their patrons-to know the difference 
between First Amendment mandate and aspirational rhetoric. 
CONCLUSION 
This article proposes that the library profession reexamine the cur- 
rent Library Bill of Rights, remove from it those statements that repre- 
sent mere rhetoric, those that are ambiguous and unrealistic, and those 
that represent laudable aspirational and inspirational principles. What is 
left-a true Bill of Rights-would include only those principles demanded 
by the U. S. Constitution. This document would provide library profes- 
sionals and patrons with clear, legitimate principles. Material culled from 
the document could then be fine-tuned, clarified, and integrated with 
the principles set forth in the current Code of Ethics. This code-per- 
haps to be renamed a Statement of Philosophy-would be directed at 
library professionals only, would serve as a statement of aspiration and 
inspiration, and, if the profession so chose, would form a part of the em- 
ployment relationship. By doing so, librarians and library patrons could 
separate rhetoric from rights; by doing so, the library profession would 
be left with principles that reflect reality. 
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APPENDIX 
ALA CODE OF ETHICS 
AS MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN 
LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, we recog- 
nize the importance of codifying and 
making known to the profession and 
to the general public the ethical prin- 
ciples that guide the work of librarians, 
other professionals providing informa- 
tion services, library trustess, and li- 
brary staffs. 
Ethical dilemmas occur when val- 
ues are in conflict. The American Li- 
brary Association Code of Ethics states 
the values to which we are committed, 
and embodies the ethical responsibili- 
ties of the profession in this changing 
information environment. 
We significantly influence or con- 
trol the selection, organization, pres- 
ervation, and disseminatiion of infor-
mation. In a political system grounded 
in an informed citizenry, we are mem- 
bers of a profession explicitly commit- 
ted to intellectual freedom and the 
freedom of access to information. We 
have a special obligation to ensure the 
free flow of information and ideas to 
present and future generations. 
The principles of this Code are 
expressed in broad statements to guide 
ethical decision making. These state- 
ments provide a framework; they can- 
not and do not dictate conduct to cover 
particular situations. 
1. We provide the highest level of 
service to all library users through appre 
priate and usefully organized resources; 
equitable service policies; equitable ac- 
cess; and accurate, unbiased, and cour- 
teous responses to all requests. 
11. We uphold the principles of 
intellectual freedom and resist all ef- 
forts to censor library resources. 
111.We protect each library users’s 
right to privacy and confidentiality with 
respect to information sought or re- 
ceived and resources consulted, bor- 
rowed, acquired, or transmitted. 
Iv.We recognize and respect in- 
tellectual property rights. 
V. We treat co-workers and other 
colleagues with respect, fairness, and 
good faith, and advocate conditions of 
employment that safeguard the rights 
and welfare of all employees of our in- 
stitutions. 
VI.We do not advance private in- 
terests at the expense of library users, 
colleagues, or our employing institu- 
tions. 
VII. We distinguish between our 
personal convictions and professional 
duties and do not allow our personal 
beliefs to interfere with fair represen- 
tation of the aims of our institutions 
or the provision of access to their in- 
formation resources. 
VIII. We strive for excellence in 
the profession by maintaining and en- 
hancing our own knowledge and skills, 
by encouraging the professional devel- 
opment of coworkers, and by fostering 
the aspirations of potential members 
of the profession. 
--Adopted by ALA Council, 
,June 28, 1995 
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NOTES 
Two Californian women nearly died when they ate a poisonous mushroom identified in 

The Encyclofiedia of Mushrooms as harmless. “Publisher off Hook in Mushroom Poisoning.” 

OrlundoSentinel Tribune, July 14, 1991, p. A18. 

The author raised such a question after taking her nineyeamld daughter to the Kalamazoo, 

Michigan, public library many years ago. In response to the author’s inquiry about the Nancy Drew 

books, the librarian responded haughtily “Wedon’t c q s i c h  books.” Clearly, the librarian consid- 

ered the books too “low culture” for such an institution.

3 Dianne Hopkins, University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Library and Information 

Studies, has used this term to describe the current Library Bill of Rights. The term 

properly reflects those portions of the Bill which serve legitimate aspirational, inspira- 

tional goals, but which are not supported by current legal doctrine. 

Of course, the current ALA Code of Ethics lacks such force for the same reasons. 

See I n  re Geruld M. Schwartz, 532 N.W.2d 450, 193 Wis.2d 157 (1995) (eighteen months); 

I n  re WilliamJ. Schmitz, 532 N.W.2d 716, 193 Wis.2d 279 (1995) (sixty days); In re LarryJ. 

Barber, 194 Wis.2d 279 (1995) (six months). 
‘ 	See I n  rrJejjfrqJ Tqeelske, 1995 Wisc. LEXIS 107 (1995). 
See I n  reRobert El RudoZph, 522 N.W.2d 219,187 Wis.2d 323 (1994). The attorney was also 
ordered to pay full restitution to the clients within sixty days. 
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